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Periodic Model Changes in Oligopoly
Stephen Martin 
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ABSTRACT: In a single-period quantity-setting duopoly where tlie
effect of periodic model changes is to maintain consumer uncertainty 
about the likelihood that the product will be satisfactory, both firms 
can earn greater profit by making model changes than by standardizing 
their products, but a prisoner's dilemma pattern of payoffs makes 
standardization by both firms the only noncooperative equilibrium. In 
a repeated version of the same game, persistent model changes may 
emerge as a noncooperative equilibrium.
JEL Classification Numbers: 022, 61 1






















































































































































































Any customer can have a car- painted any color 
that he wants, so long as it is black.
Henry Ford
I. Introduction
Economists' models of product differentiation fall into two broad 
classes. In nonspatial models, the degree of product differentiation 
is usually taken to be exogenous, and the model is used to explain the 
consequences of changes in the degree of product differentiation for 
various aspects of market performance.1 In spatial models, the 
extent of product differentiation is endogenous, with the choice of 
product characteristics treated by analogy with the choice of 
location. Early spatial models, following Hotelling [1929], examined 
firms' equilibrium choices of location or product characteristics when 
firms' choices can be changed without cost. More recent spatial 
models examine equilibrium product differentiation when product 
characteristics, once chosen, cannot be changed.2
These literatures do not address a kind of product 
differentiation that is common for consumer durable experience goods. 
Producers of automobiles, big-ticket kitchen appliances, stereo 
equipment, video cassette recorders, and like goods routinely bring 
out new versions of their principal products every year.3 The new 
model is usually described as embodying startling improvements, and
1. See Spence [1976a, 1976b] for seminal examples, or more recently 
Vives [1984] and Majerus [1988],
2. See Prescott and Vtsscher [1977], Lane [1980], and Neven [1987],
3. Sometimes the same sort of mode! changes appear for producer 
durable goods - construction equipment and tractors are examples. 




























































































sometimes this may be the case. More often, however, differences from 
one year to the next appear, on any objective basis, to be relatively
minor.
One effect of such model changes, particularly for durable 
experience goods, is to maintain consumer uncertainty about product 
quality. If the most recent automobile I purchased was a Model T 
Ford, if my uncle and father-in-law and several co-workers own Model T 
Fords, and Model T Fords are the same from one year to the next, then 
I have a very good idea whether or not a Model T Ford will satisfy my 
needs. If the most recent automobile I purchased was a year t  Model 
T Ford, while some relatives own newer or older versions, that are 
thought to differ in vaguely specified ways, and some co-workers own 
Ford automobiles that bear different names (but seem to be similar In 
some ways to the Model T), then I will have a much less precise idea 
whether or not next year's Model T Ford will satisfy my needs.
In the model outlined here, if product quality is uncertain, 
demand maximizes expected utility. Periodic model changes result in 
some sales to consumers who believe, incorrectly, that they will find 
the product satisfactory. If product quality is known, on the other 
hand, demand maximizes utility, and consumers who know they would find 
the product unsatisfactory drop out of the market. However, some 
consumers with high reservation prices remain in the market. Whether 
a firm prefers to engage in periodic model changes depends on which 
type of demand yields greater profit.
Given this type of demand, I investigate conditions under which 
standardization and/or mode! changes will emerge as equilibrium 






























































































Product quality is modeled very simply: either a consumer finds 
the product satisfactory, or he does not. Demand when product quality 
is known but the product is unsatisfactory to some consumers and 
demand when product quality is unknown but the product is expected to 
be unsatisfactory to some consumers are derived from the structure of 
demand when it is known that the product will be satisfactory to all 
consumers.4
The quality index % >s the probability that the product will be 
satisfactory. I f the product is standardized, x  is known. A fraction 
1 - x  of consumers, who would purchase the product if it were 
satisfactory, do not buy because they know they will find it 
unsatisfactory.
Because the product is a durable good, individual consumers 
purchase relatively infrequently. If the producer engages in regular 
model changes, prospective purchasers are uncertain of the quality of 
the current model, even though they may have purchased an earlier 
model at some point in the past. In this case, demand maximizes 
expected utility.
I f it were known that the product would be satisfactory to all 
consumers, social welfare would be
where m represents expenditure on all other goods. The implied 
inverse demand and demand curves are linear;
Cl) U(q) - aq - Jybq2 + m,
(2a) p = a - bq
(2b)





























































































Figure li Demand curves, Product Standardization vs. Model Changes
If the product is standardized and it is known that its quality 
X < 1 ,1  - x  of consumers, at any price, drop out of the market. 




q * X - b 
b.
P * a - x q '
As shown in Figure 1, if product quality is known but x  < 1, the 
demand curve rotates in a clockwise direction around its price-axis 
intercept, compared with the demand curve described by equations (2). 
Some consumers with high reservation prices stay in the market, but 
the quantity demanded at any price falls.
I f the firm makes regular model changes, consumers do not know 
the quality of the particular model currently on the market. Expected 
quality is Xt expected utility is
(4) E(U) - x(aq - ybq2] + m.
and the equations of the inverse demand and demand curves are
(5a) p - x (a '  bq)
(5b) ■ - s
When product quality is uncertain, the demand curve rotates in a 




























































































compared with the demand curve described by equations (2). Consumers 
with high reservation prices drop out of the market because they 
expect to find the product unsatisfactory. For some consumers with 
high reservation prices, this expectation is incorrect.
Assume that the cost function is 
(6a) c(q() - cq^ i * 1,2
if variety i is standardized and 
(6b) C(q ) = cq -  F, i * 1,2
if the producer of variety i introduces a new model every year. F is 
the fixed and sunk cost of making periodic model changes.
Monopoly profit when the product is standardized is
(7) *?T - X b ( § ] 2.
where S -  (a - c)/b is the quantity that would be demanded if the 
product were known to be satisfactory and price were equal to marginal 
cost.
With periodic model changes, monopoly profit is
where - (xa -  c)/b.
From equations (7) and (8), we have 
(9) - ngc - 1 4x Xc(xS * Sx) ♦ F a 0 ,
with equality holding only if x - I and F - 0. For the model 
considered here, therefore
Proposition 1; If it is costly to engage in model changes, a 




























































































III. Duopoly - The Structure of Demand 
A. Both Varieties Known to be Satisfactory
Each of two firms produces one variety of a differentiated 
product. If it were known that both varieties would be satisfactory, 
the social welfare function would be
(10) UCq,fl2̂ n) - a(q| + q2) - |(q^ * 28q(q2 ♦ qij) + m
The implied inverse demand curves are linear,
a ia) P| = * a - b(q, * eV
U lb ) P2 “ dq~2 '  3 '  b(8qi + q23 '
0 is a product differentiation parameter. If 8 * 0 ,  products are 
completely differentiated. I f 8 * 1, products are standardized.5
It is convenient to write the inverse demand curves in terms of 
deviations of prices from marginal cost. Using the cost functions 
(6a) and (6b), as appropriate, (11a) and ( l i b )  become 
(12a) p( - c ♦ b[S -  qt -  0q2)
(12b) P2 * c -  b(S -  8qi - q2) .
The demand curves implied by (12a) and (12b) are6 
(13a) q, - l - f - 0  - b 7 ^ l p, ‘  c - 0[P2 " c3]
(13b) q2 - -  b "  ~ 8(P- * C)I •
5. This approach to the modeling of product differentiation is due to 
Spence [1976a]. The assumption that products are differentiated 
complicates the algebra of the model, but is necessary to permit the 
study of price-setting firms.
6. Prices and quantities must be nonnegative, which implies certain 
restrictions on the ranges over which the equations of the demand 




























































































B. Both Varieties Standardized
If variety i is known to be of quality x,. i * 1.2, where 
0 s X, -  1, then the fraction 1 -  Xj ° f  consumers who find 





. ( r 4 - e  - b r ^ ~ F fp> ■ c '  0(p2 " c)1}
■ { r * T 2 Ip 2 - C - 0{Pl c)]
respectively. By inversion, inverse demand curves if varieties are 
known to be of qualities x, and X2> respectively, are
(15a) Pi ‘  c + b |[«-1[5 * i ]
(15b) p2 - c .  b [*■1RR]1]
C. Neither Variety Standardized
If both firms engage in regular model changes, realized social 
welfare depends on whether or not the product is found to be 
satisfactory after purchase. If both varieties are found to be 
satisfactory, social welfare is given by equation (10). I f after 
purchase variety i is found to be unsatisfactory, social welfare is 
given by equation (10) with q( 3et equal to zero.
Expected social welfare is therefore 
E(U) - X ^ U tq ^ j )  - X,U - X2)U(q,.0) * (1 - X,)x2U(0,q2)
* (1 - X,K 1 X 2)U(0,0)
(16)
X,(aq, - |qf) » X2Caq2 - §q*) - b X .X ^ q ,  - m .






























































































Pi '  ™  '  Xlla '  b(qi " ®X2q2)]
- t * b[s, -  x,q, - 0x,x2q2)
p2 '  ^  - V a - bt8x,q, * q2»
= c * b[s2 -  ex,x2q, -  x 2q2J .
where S, = (x,a -  c)/b, I «  1,2.
By inversion, demand curves if varieties are of expected 
qualities x, a™1 X2 are
c
(18a)
q> = i - e V , ! * .  '  632 '  b [
0(P2 - c)
(18b) q.




D. One Variety Standardized
Suppose now that variety 1 is standardized, while variety 2 
brings out a new model every year, and is believed to be of quality 
X2- Expected utility is
(19)
E(U) = XjUCqj.qj) * (1 - X2)U(q],0)
‘  aqi - ;h? * x 2[aq2 ■ l q2 “ 8bqiq2J + m •
The implied inverse demand curves and demand curves are
c + b(S - qJ - X28q2)(20a) n .  2 IM  pl 3q|
(20b) „  3ECU)
p 2 “ aq2
and
(21a) q, - . 1 2 [  S
1 ( i  - x 2e ) L
(21b)
q= '  x ,U  - x,02) ^
b(s2 - ex2q, - x 2q2)
s - es ,
P[ -  C -  0(p2 - c) ]
P2 -  C - X20(p, ~ C) ]
However, (21a) holds only if it is known that variety 1 will be 




























































































factor x,. since consumers who would find the product unsatisfactory 
drop out of the market. I f variety 1 is standardized and x, < 1. 
demand for variety 1 is
Inverting (21a)' and (21b), we obtain the inverse demand curves if 
variety 1 is standardized at quality x, and variety 2 engages in
model changes and is of expected quality x 2!
(22a)
p . = c * b [  s - * 8* 2q: )  ]
r  r q i i  n(22b) p2 - C ♦ b | ^ s 2 - x 2( ^ -  ♦ q2 J  _
Demand curves and inverse demand curves if variety 1 engages in model 
changes and variety 2 is standardized are obtained from equations (21) 
and (22) by permuting subscripts in an obvious way.
III. Quantity-setting Duopoly
Formally, this is a two-stage game. In the first stage, each 
firm picks a marketing strategy - to standardize its product (ST) or 
to engage In periodic model changes (MC). Choices are revealed, and 
In the second stage of the game each firm picks its profit-maximizing 
output, taking the output of the other firm as given. Each firm's 
strategy therefore specifies a marketing strategy and an output pair. 
Each firm's output is the Cournot quantity-setting equilibrium output, 
given choices of marketing strategy.
The inverse demand curves (15), (17), and (22) are used to 




































































































Note; upper term in each quadrant is firm l 's  payoff, lower term in 
each quadrant is firm 2's payoff.
Firm 2
ST________________ _ _______________ MC
, r s 'i2 b r 25 ~ 652 "\axibL 2 - e J
h f  s  'I2 b
a 4 x / , 
r  2s= - ex2s ^
\
2
x2bl 2 + e „ *2l 4 - x2e2 J
b r 2S, - 6x,S ^ b |r 2S, - 0X,S2 ^2
xl 4 - V 2 J M. 4 - eV 2 J
*2b|< 2S - es,
2
b
f  2s2 - 8x2s, >2
F
 ̂4 - v 2 J *2l  4 * eV 2 ^
expressions for payoffs under alternative strategic combinations in 
the single-period quantity-setting game are shown in Table l . 7
Suppose first that the model describes a one-shot game. If the 
two products are sufficiently poor substitutes - if 6 is sufficiently 
close to zero - each firm will be very nearly a monopolist in its own 
market. From the results of the previous section, it follows that if 
0 is sufficiently small, each firm will earn a greater equilibrium 
profit by standardizing its product than by making model changes. In 
noncooperative equilibrium, each firm will standardize its product.





























































































2: Single-period payoffs, quantity-setting duopoly 



















i MC 1,113.9 984.1
Note: upper term in each quadrant is firm l 's  payoff, lower element
in each quadrant is firm 2’s payoff.
Even if 0 is close to one, numerical evaluation shows that the only 
noncooperative equilibrium in a one-shot game is for both firms to 
standardize their product.8 If the fixed cost of making model 
changes is sufficiently large, both firms will be strictly worse off 
if both make model changes, than if both standardize their products, 
as in Table 2(a). But if the fixed cost of making model changes is 
small, the pattern of payoffs is that of the prisoners' dilemma game 
For the parameter values in Table 2(b), both firms would be strictly
8. Programs to evaluate payoffs for quantity- and price-setting games 




























































































better off making regular model changes. In noncooperative 
equilibrium, however, they standardize their products.
Now suppose Table 1 is thought of as giving the single-period 
payoffs in an infinitely repeated game. Let firms maximize payoffs 
that are the present-discounted value of income streams built up out 
of the single-period payoffs given in Table 1. I f the fixed cost of 
model changes is sufficiently large, as in Table 2(a), noncooperative 
equilibrium in the repeated game will have each firm standardize its 
product. But if the fixed cost of model changes is small, and the 
discount rate is sufficiently low, use of a trigger strategy that 
threatens reversion to the standardized product regime if a firm 
defects will allow the duopoly to sustain the use of model changes as 
a noncooperative equilibrium.9-10
The results of this section can be summarized as
Proposition 2: The noricooperative equilibrium strategy in a one-shot
quantity-setting game calls for both firms to standardize their 
products. One noncooperative equilibrium in an infinitely repeated 
version of the same game repeats the single-period equilibrium, period 
after period. If the discount rate and the fixed cost of model 
changes are sufficiently small, another noncooperative equilibrium in 
the infinitely repeated game will be for both firms to make regular 
model changes. 910
9. See Friedman [1971] for discussion of a trigger strategy defined 
in terms of outputs.
10. If a single firm defected from (MC,MC) in an infinitely repeated 
game, it would presumably take some time for consumers to learn the 
quality of the newly standardized product. Without modeling this 
learning process in detail, the present discounted value of the income 
stream resulting from defection would be less than that implied by 
using the payoffs in Table 1, which assumes that consumers know the 
quality of the variety as soon as it is standardized. If a 
noncooperative pattern of model changes can be sustained for the 
payoffs in Table 1, therefore, it can also be sustained if it takes 





























































































In the first stage of the price-setting game, each firm picks a 
marketing strategy. Choices are revealed, and in the second stage of 
the game each firm picks its profit-maximizing price, taking the price 
of the other firm as given. Each firm's strategy is therefore a 
marketing strategy-price pair. Each firm’s price is the Bertrand 
price-setting equilibrium price, given choices of marketing strategy.
The demand curves (14), (18), and (21a)' and (21b) are used to 
express single-period profits as functions of prices. General 
expressions for single-period payoffs in the price-setting game are 
shown in Table 3.11
As in the quantity-setting game, it follows from consideration of 
the monopoly case that if 9 is sufficiently close to zero, the only 
noncooperative equilibrium in the single-shot game will have both 
firms standardize their product.
Two types of noncooperative equilibria emerge in the single-shot 
price-setting game as 0 approaches 1. For intermediate values of 9, 
each firm standardizes its product in noncooperative equilibrium. If 
the fixed cost of making model changes is sufficiently small, payoffs 
assume the prisoners' dilemma pattern that occurred in the quantity­
setting game. An example is shown in Table 4(a).
11. If 0 = 1 and firms set prices and firms standardize products, 
noncooperative (Bertrand) equilibrium payoffs equal zero. If 8 «  1, 
firms can earn a positive profit, depending on the size of fixed cost, 






























































































































































































































































Table 4: Single-period payoffs, price-setting duopoly
a = 101, c = 1, , F = 1, x, = 0.75, x2 = 0.5












Note: upper term in each quadrant is firm l 's  payoff, lower element
in each quadrant is firm 2's payoff.
But for values of 8 very near 1, noncooperative equilibria call 
for one firm to make model changes and the other to standardize its 
product and reveal its product's quality. For the example of Figure 
4(b}, (STJ4C1 and (MC,ST) are both noncooperative equilibrium 
strategies. The firm which standardizes its product earns the greater 
return. Arriving first in a price-setting market for a durable 
consumer experience good is an advantage, if later varieties are close 
substitutes; the first mover can opt to standardize. In such 








































































































In an infinitely repeated version of the price-setting game, a 
trigger strategy could sustain periodic model changes as equilibrium 
marketing strategies, if stage game payoffs assume the prisoner's 
dilemma pattern and the discount rate is sufficiently low. We thus 
have
Proposition 3; The noncooperative equilibrium strategy in a one-shot 
price-setting game calls for both firms to standardize their products 
unless 6 is near 1, and for one firm to standardize its product while 
the other makes model changes. One type of noncooperative equilibrium 
in an infinitely repeated version of the same game repeats the single­
shot equilibrium, period after period. I f the single shot equilibrium 
is for both firms to standardize their products and the discount rate 
and the fixed cost of model changes are sufficiently small, another 
noncooperative equilibrium in the infinitely repeated game will be for 
both firms to make regular model changes.
V. Final Remarks
The effect of periodic model changes is to maintain consumer 
uncertainty about product quality. In this model, it will never be 
profitable for a monopolist to engage in regular model changes. In 
one-shot quantity-setting games, and in one-shot price-setting duopoly 
games if products are poor substitutes, noncooperative equilibrium 
strategies call for both firms to standardize their product, although 
for sufficiently low values of fixed cost both firms would earn 
greater profit if both made periodic model changes. In dynamic 





























































































Appendix: Derivation of payoffs under alternative marketing
strategies
Quantity-setting firms
(ST.ST): firm l ’s profit is
(A. I f 7t, - b [ >  ( qi q2X, * 0x 2
Maximizing, one obtains firm l ’s 




r  2 ,*i
M  1  » 'X ,
, 0/*2 
2/X2 h :; ] - c
Equilibrium outputs are
(A. 3) (.';)■*( ;;l
and substitution in the profit equations yields the payoffs for this 
case.
(MC,MC): firm l 's  profit is
(a .4) rr, - bis, - x ,(q, * 9*2q2)]q,
The resulting system of reaction curves is
F .
(A. 5)
Equilibrium outputs are 
(A. 6)
and substitution in the profit equations yields the payoffs for this 
case.
(ST.MC): Expressions for the firm’s profits appear above. The
reaction curves form the system of equations
r  q‘ i  1 f'  2 r  i
1 %  J  4 - e\ x 2 l 2 J L  v x 2 J





























































































(A. 8) 1 (
and substitution yields the payoffs for this case. Payoffs for the
(MC,ST) case are symmetric.
Price-setting firms 
(ST,ST): firm l 's  profit is
X p - c
(A.9) 71, =  -----^  - !-g  [(1 -  0)bS -  (p( - c) * 0(p2 -  c)]
Maximization yields the equation of firm l 's  price reaction curve. 
The system of equations formed by the reaction curves is
- » >  a i
Equilibrium prices are
( Pp; - •  h - h d  ■
and substitution yields equilibrium payoffs for this case.
(MC.MC): firm l's  profit is
(A. 12)n, . ~ c f .
1 - 02X,X2 \  x i
- F .
The system of price reaction curves that result from maximization of 
the firms’ profits is
(A. 13)
(A. 14)
- e > r  p, - r  1/x. -e
2' J I p2 - C J = bl -e " * 2
ibrium prices
bx,x2 f 2/X2 6 1
4 - 02X,X2l e 2 / x J l  -e 1




























































































(ST.MC): expressions for profits appear above. The system of 
equations of reaction curves is
( 2 -  0 2<- 2[A. 1 5)
with resulting equilibrium prices 
(A. 16)
Substitution in the expressions for profit yields payoffs for this 
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